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1 Introduction
The last decades have seen an explosive growth in biosciences, and astonishing
progress in the mathematical modelling of fields as diverse as neurobiology, mem-
brane formation, biomechanics, embryology, etc. (see e.g. J. Murray, 1990). The
sequencing of biomolecules produces such a vast wealth of data on proteins and
polynucleotides that the mere handling of the stored information becomes a com-
putational challenge, let alone the analysis of phylogenetic trees and functional net-
works which is the main task of bioinformatics.
The recent advances in our understanding of the chemical mechanisms describing
the interactions of specific molecules – how virus, for example, use binding proteins
to attack and penetrate hosts cells – are spectacular, but do not suffice to tackle
basic problems like disease progression or the co-evolution of hosts and parasites.
It is populations of virus particles, or immune cells, or hosts, that regulate each
other’s frequencies. The feedback loops of these ecosystems are too complex to
be understood by verbal arguments alone. The biological community has come
to accept that basic aspects of immunology and evolutionary ecology can only be
analysed by mathematical means.
This has not always been the case. The pioneering work in genetics due to
Fisher, Haldane, Wright, and Kimura, as well as the epidemiological models of
Kermack and McKendrick occupied a marginal position in biology for the most
part of this century, while at the same time motivating important mathematical
advances in statistics, stochastic processes and dynamical systems (Fisher (1918) on
correlation, Kolmogoroff (1937) on travelling waves in a gene pool, May (1976) on
chaos). The models of evolutionary biology cannot compete in mathematical depth
and sophistication with those of theoretical physics, but they offer a wide range of
questions of great intuitive appeal.
This lecture surveys mathematical models in ecology and evolution, emphasising
the major feedback mechanisms regulating the population densities of the inter-
acting self-replicating units – be they genes, virus particles, immune cells or host
organisms. The great variety of biological examples made it necessary to economise
on mathematical diversity, by keeping to the framework of ordinary differential equa-
tions. This is certainly not meant to imply that time delays, spatial heterogeneities
and stochastic fluctuations are secondary effects. In fact, they have a major impact
in many applications (see, e.g., the survey by Levin et al., 1997)
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Figure 1: Predator-prey equations
2 Population Ecology
If we assume that n species live in an ecosystem, that xi is the density of species i
and that its per capita growth rate x˙i/xi depends on the densities of the interacting
populations, then we obtain the ecological equation
x˙i = xifi(x). (1)
The state space Rn+ is invariant; so are its boundary faces, where one or several of the
densities are 0; and the restriction of (1) to a face is again an ecological equation.
If the fi are affine linear, we obtain – as simplest example – the Lotka-Volterra
equation
x˙i = xi(ri +
∑
aijxj) (2)
(i = 1, ..., n). It should be stated right at the outset that many ecological interactions
display more complex interaction terms; but often, (2) offers a first approximation
which is flexible enough to embody the main aspects of the community structure
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). For instance, if 1 is a prey species and 2 its predator,
we obtain
x˙1 = x1(a− bx2) (3)
x˙2 = x2(−c+ dx1). (4)
where a, b, c, d > 0. In intR2+ there exists a unique fixed point (c/d, a/b) which
is surrounded by periodic orbits. If we add a self-limitation of the prey, i.e. set
f1 = a− ex1 − bx2 in (3), we obtain damped oscillations around the fixed point, or
(if e > 0 is large) extinction of the predator (see Fig. 1):
On the other hand, if 1 and 2 are species competing for the same resources, we
have to assume that the intrinsic growth rates satisfy ri > 0 and the interaction
terms aij < 0 (i, j ∈ {1, 2}). On each positive half-axis, there is one fixed point
Fi corresponding to equilibrium of species i in the absence of the other species.
Generically, there are three possible outcomes (see Fig. 2): (a) dominance: all
orbits in intR2+ converge to Fi; species i is said to dominate the other species;
(b) coexistence: there exists a fixed point F12 ∈ intR2+ which is globally stable
(i.e. attracts all orbits in intR2+);
(c) bistability: F12 is a saddle; almost all orbits in intR2+ converge to F1 or F2,
depending on the initial condition.
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Figure 2: Competition equations
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Figure 3: Heteroclinic orbits and networks
Because two-dimensional Lotka-Volterra equations admit no limit cycles, their
dynamics can be easily classified; for three or more species, this is no longer the
case. Systems with two competing species and one prey exhibit chaos (Gilpin,
1979) and systems with three competing species (which are monotonic and hence
admit no chaos, see Hirsch, 1988) have not been classified yet, in spite of impressive
progress (van den Driessche and Zeeman, 1997). One of the reasons is the existence
of heteroclinic cycles see Fig. 3a (May and Leonard, 1975). If, in the absence of
the third species, species 1 dominates 2, 2 dominates 3 and 3, in turn, dominates
1, then the boundary of R3+ contains a heteroclinic cycle consisting of three saddle
points Fi (with only species i present) and three connecting orbits (orbit o1 has
F2 as α- and F1 as ω-limit etc). Depending on the products of the eigenvalues
in the stable and unstable directions, this heteroclinic cycle can attract or repel
the neighbouring orbits in intR3+. Three competing species with heteroclinic cycles
have been found in laboratory populations. In higher dimensional ecological models,
heteroclinic cycles become common. Such cycles are non-generic features for general
dynamical systems, since saddle-connections can be destroyed by arbitrarily small
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perturbations. Within the class of ecological equations, however, which leave the
boundary faces of Rn+ invariant, heteroclinic cycles and networks (where several
cycles issue from one saddle) are usually robust. Such attractors offer a new brand
of nonlinear dynamics: orbits approach saddle points ever more closely, and remain
there for increasingly long times; furthermore, the sequence of saddles visited by an
orbit can switch in arbitrary order from one cycle to another (Chawanya, 1995).
3 Permanence
If the orbit of an ecosystem reaches the neighborhood of a heteroclinic attractor on
the boundary, some species are doomed. The ecosystem, in that case, is unstable:
this kind of stability has nothing to do, however, with the usual asymptotic stability
of a fixed point, which is a local notion. A more suitable stability notion in this
context is that of permanence: (1) is said to be permanent if the boundary (including
infinity) is a repellor, i.e. if there exists a compact setK ⊂ intRn+ such that whenever
initially x ∈ intRn+, then x(t) ∈ K for t sufficiently large. (After a transient phase,
all densities are uniformly bounded away from 0). This notion has been extensively
explored (see the survey by Hutson and Schmitt, 1992). Permanence implies the
existence of a fixed point in intRn+, but this point need not be locally stable; and
indeed ecologists view an ecosystem as stable even if it exhibits violent oscillations,
as long as its species remain safe from extinction.
For a dissipative system (all orbits uniformly bounded from above), the most
useful sufficient condition for permanence is the existence of an average Lyapunov
function. This is a function P vanishing on the boundary and positive on the
interior such that the continuous extension Ψ of the logarithmic derivative of P has
the property that for every ω-limit point x on bdRn+ there is a T > 0 with
∫ T
0
Ψ(x(t))dt > 0. (5)
Then P grows (in the long run) along every interior orbit sufficiently close to the
boundary. In particular (2) is permanent if all orbits are uniformly bounded and
the set
D := {x ∈ Rn+ : ri +
∑
aijxj < 0, i = 1, ..., n} (6)
is disjoint from the convex hull of the fixed points on the boundary. The condition
is not necessary for permanence if n > 3. But if (2) is permanent, then there
is a unique equilibrium xˆ with all species present, and it is the limit of all time-
averages of orbits in the interior of the state-space. If D is the Jacobian at xˆ, then
(−1)n detD > 0, and trace D < 0. Furthermore, (−1)n detA > 0, where A is the
matrix of the interaction terms aij (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
4 Invasion
Many studies have considered the assembly of ecological communities by sequential
invasion (i.e. adding one species at a time). Will species n+1 grow when introduced
in small numbers? If the resident system is in equilibrium z = (z1, ..., zn), this simply
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means to check whether the growth rate fn+1(z, 0) is positive. If the competition
between two species is bistable, for instance, none can invade the other. If there
is coexistence, each can invade, etc. Invasion is a question of transversal stability,
which, if the resident system admits a chaotic attractor, offers subtle ergodic twists
involving riddled basins of attraction etc (Ferriere and Gatto, 1995, Ashwin et al,
1996).
If the resident species obey a permanent Lotka-Volterra equation with fixed
point z ∈ intSn, the condition fn+1(z, 0) > 0 implies that the lim sup of the in-
vading species’ density is positive, but tells nothing about the lim inf. The new
attractor need not be close to the former one; the invading species can drive others
to extinction, and even ultimately itself. Hofbauer (1998) has found conditions in
terms of spatial or temporal averages of the initial growth rate which guarantee that
the invasion of a permanent Lotka-Volterra community succeeds. His bifurcation
analysis allows to decide whether, if a parameter changes so that invasion becomes
possible, the new attractor is contained in a neighborhood of the resident attractor
or not. The invasion of a heteroclinic cycle is a particularly arduous problem.
Evidence from field studies and numerical simulations suggest that ecosystems
become increasingly harder to invade as time goes on, and that there is an up-
per limit to how ‘closely packed’ species can be; but so far, this has only been
demonstrated under restrictive assumptions (Law and Blackford, 1992). Interest-
ingly, predators can stabilise ecosystems: if a ‘keystone’ predator is removed from
a permanent system, the remaining system is no longer permanent. For instance,
if species 1 dominates species 2, or if the competition between species 1, 2 and 3
results in a heteroclinic attractor, then a suitable predator can mediate co-existence;
Schreiber (1998) has produced systems with n competing prey, each with its spe-
cialised predator, such that removal of one predator species results in only one
prey species surviving. Such ecosystems cannot be obtained by simply adding one
species at a time; sequential assembly has to proceed in a more roundabout way,
using species that are later eliminated like a scaffolding. These results agree well
with the current emphasis of biologists on the role of contingency and history depen-
dence in real ecological succession chronicles, and highlight the fact that a successful
invasion can initiate a complex sequence of changes in the ecosystem (see Mylius et
al, 1998).
5 Replicator Dynamics
Competition between conspecifics drives natural selection. The basic mechanism is
simple: an inheritable trait which allows for a higher reproductive success spreads
in the population. This can lead to extraordinary feats of adaptation due to re-
lentless optimisation under constraint. In fact, some computational approaches to
optimisation problems are mimicking the massively parallel algorithm of Darwinian
evolution. Within ‘populations’ of possible solutions to a given problem (for instance
in aerodynamics), those which perform better are allowed to multiply at the expense
of the others. Occasionally, some ‘offspring’ is randomly altered, corresponding to
the mutation or recombination of existing solutions. Such genetic algorithms allow
to explore the space of solutions and often to home in on some optima (Forrest,
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1993).
But in biology, it is the population itself that is often the problem. The efficiency
of a wing shape may be independent on what the other birds are doing, but the
success of a sex ratio or of a given degree of aggressivity is not. In a population
with a surplus of males, it pays to produce females; it pays to escalate a conflict if
the others are unlikely to escalate, but otherwise it is better to avoid escalating, etc.
Game theory, rather than optimisation, is appropriate to deal with problems where
the success depends on what the others are doing.
Assume that xi is the frequency of the individuals using strategy i (i = 1, ..., n). A
strategy, in this context, is simply a trait (behavioural, physiological, morphological)
whose payoff, i.e. average reproductive success, depends on the frequencies x of the
competing types. If the traits are inherited, the frequencies will evolve in time,
depending on their success. If individuals breed true, the per capita rate of increase
x˙i/xi is given by the difference fi− f¯ , where fi(x) is the average payoff for using i if
the population is in state x, and f¯ =
∑
xjfj is the average success in the population.
This yields the replicator equation
x˙i = xi(fi(x)− f¯) i = 1, ..., n (7)
on the simplex Sn = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑
xi = 1}. This simplex is invariant, and so are
its faces. The replicator equation is closely related to the ecological equation (1), of
course. It introduces an ecological viewpoint into game theory.
Let us consider a conflict between pairs of individuals, for instance some contest
over a resource, and assume that the strategies i correspond to different types of
fighting behaviour, and that aij is the average payoff for using i if the co-player
uses j. Then the payoff matrix A = (aij) determines the average payoff (Ax)i =
ai1x1 + ...+ ainxn for strategy i in the population (assuming that individuals meet
randomly) and (7) turns into
x˙i = xi((Ax)i − x
TAx). (8)
This equation is not only similar, but actually equivalent to a Lotka-Volterra
equation for n − 1 species: a diffeomorphism from Sn (minus one face) to Rn−1+
maps orbits of one dynamical system onto the other, and vice versa (Hofbauer
1981). For n = 2, we obtain the same generic behaviour as for two competitors:
dominance, coexistence or bistability. For n = 3, heteroclinic cycles show up (not
just as a theoretic possibility: the mate guarding strategies of male lizards form a
rock-scissors-paper cycle). With n > 3, limit cycles and chaotic attractors occur.
(8) is permanent if there exists a p = (p1, ..., pn) with pi > 0 for all i such that for
every equilibrium z on the boundary,
pTAz > zTAz (9)
(a conditions that can easily be checked by linear programming), etc.
Frequency-dependent selection will not optimise, in general. Only for very special
interaction do replicator equations become gradients: if the game is symmetric, for
instance (A = AT ) or more generally if the partial derivatives fi,j = ∂fi/∂xj obey
fi,j + fj,k + fk,l = fl,k + fk,j + fj,i (10)
for all i, j, k (one has to use a suitable Riemannian metric on Sn, cf. Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998).
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6 Other Game Dynamics
Among higher animals, and in particular humans, strategies can also spread by
learning and imitation. Depending on the details of transmission, this leads to a large
number of game dynamics for the frequencies xi, often based on underlying stochastic
processes. Again, the replicator dynamics is a kind of benchmark. Another example
is the best reply dynamics (a differential inclusion)
x˙i ∈ β(x)− xi (11)
where β(x) is the set of strategies whose payoff (in a population where strategy i
occurs with frequency xi) is maximal. The idea is that in every short time interval,
a small fraction of the players updates their strategy: these players know how to
optimise, but do not anticipate that others will also update. The orbits of (11) are
piecewise linear. Intriguingly, their asymptotic behaviour is often that of the time
averages of the solutions of the replicator equation (8).
This brings one closer to classical game theory. Let us consider a game with
payoff matrix A and assume that points p ∈ Sn are mixed strategies (pi being the
probability for a player to use strategy i). Then p is a best reply to q ∈ Sn if
pTAq ≥ xTAq for all x ∈ Sn. A point p is a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium if it is
a best reply against itself. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point for (8) (and every
other decent game dynamics), but the converse need not hold. In fact, the Nash
equilibria are precisely the fixed points of (8) which are saturated – missing pure
strategies have no selective advantage. Every game with finitely many strategies
has a Nash equilibrium, but there are games such that almost no solution, under
any reasonable adjustment dynamics, converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Evolutionary game theory has originated with the concept of evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESS). Intuititively, a strategy q is said to be an ESS if, whenever all
members of the population adopt it, an invading (and sufficiently small) minority
using a different strategy has no selective advantage (Maynard Smith, 1982). This
means that q is Nash, and that whenever p is an alternative best reply to q, then
qTAp > pTAp. Equivalently, q is an ESS if
qTAx > xTAx (12)
for all x 6= q in a neighborhood of q. Not every game has an ESS. The connexion
with the replicator equation is given by the following characterisation: q ∈ Sn is
an ESS if and only if, whenever q is a convex combination of the (possibly mixed)
strategies p1, ...,pm, the mean population strategy
∑
xi
p
converges (under the repli-
cator dynamics) towards q if initially it was close to q (Cressman, 1992). The idea
that evolution always results in an ESS is not justified, however. There exist consid-
erably more complex outcomes, as captured in the notion of an evolutionarily stable
attractor, for instance (Rand et al, 1994).
7 Long-term Evolution
So far we have assumed that offspring are clones of their parent: ‘like begets like’.
The machinery of Mendelian inheritance is much more complex, and we have to
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follow the frequencies of genes in the gene pool of the population. As long as the
instruction is contained in one genetic locus (an address in the genome, housing
two genes – one from the father and the other from the mother), the corresponding
dynamics for the gene frequencies in the population is still of replicator type (7).
But in general, the trait depends on several genetic loci, which can be recombined
during reproduction, and the dynamics becomes challenging.
The state x of the gene pool determines the frequencies of the different types
of individuals, who use different (pure or mixed) strategies. This determines the
frequencies p(x) of the strategies in the population, and hence the reproductive
success of each type, and therefore the rate of change in the gene frequencies x. If
the trait is determined by one genetic locus only, and if there are at most two pure
strategies, or three types of genes which can occur on that locus, then an ESS q
which is feasible is strategically stable in the sense that if a state xˆ of the gene pool
satisfies p(xˆ) = q, then every near-by state x remains close to xˆ and p(x) converges
back to q (Cressman and Hofbauer 1997). For more complex genetic mechanisms,
the relation between evolutionary stability and long-term stability (i.e. strategic
stability against every invasion attempt) remains unclear, and offers a wealth of
problems on normal forms and center manifold theory. The replicator dynamics can
be used as a first approximation in the absence of more specific information on the
genetic background. That kind of information is likely to be provided soon, and will
act as a motivational booster for the population genetics of frequency-dependent
selection.
At the present state, the best prospects for studying long-term evolution are
offered by adaptive dynamics. It is based on the assumption that replication is only
almost exact, and that occasional mistakes – mutations – occur so rarely that the
fate of one mutation (its extinction or fixation under selection) is settled before
the next mutation occurs (Metz et al, 1996). The population is thereby assumed
to consist of one type only, which can be substituted by another type etc. This
describes a dynamics in trait space which seems utterly remote from the description
of population frequencies given by replicator dynamics but which, in important cases,
reduces to it. In particular, if the trait space is a simplex (for instance, probabilities
for certain types of behaviour) with a suitable Riemannian metric, one obtains (7)
again. But this should not obscure the fact that replicator dynamics and adaptive
dynamics adress fundamentally different processes operating on distinct time-scales.
One describes short-term evolution – the population dynamics of the frequencies of
a given set of genes, or traits; the other describes long-term evolution, the repeated
introduction of new mutations (Eshel, 1996).
If the invader’s reproductive success is a linear function of its trait, then an ESS
is locally stable for each adaptive dynamics; but for many examples, this assumption
does not hold, and the evolution in trait space may well lead away from an ESS.
Often, two players engaged in a biological ‘game’ belong to different populations,
with different sets of strategies. Most of the previous results carry over to such two-
role games, but the general tendency is that there is still less stability: for instance,
no mixed strategy can belong to an ESS; there exists an incompressible volume form;
heteroclinic cycles become more frequent, etc.
The interacting populations can be different species – for instance, predators
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and their prey – and in this case adaptive dynamics leads to models of co-evolution.
A typical question in this context is whether co-evolution may lead to interaction
parameters such that the population numbers oscillate chaotically – a question on
which the jury is still out. The interacting populations can also belong to the same
species: males and females have conflicting interests about their amount of parental
investment, owners and intruders about territorial issues, etc. In that case, role-
specific strategies are likely to evolve, for example ‘if owner, be prepared to fight
to the end; if intruder, avoid escalation’ or ‘if male, try to desert your partner and
fertilise another female; if female, insist on a long engagement period that commits
your partner to a monogamous mating season’.
Before turning to some applications, it should be emphasised again that essential
aspects can change completely if supplementary effects are included, for instance
spatial distribution (Levin and Durett, Hassell et al 1991, Takeuchi, 1996), genetic
or physiological heterogeneity (Dushoff and Levin, 1995), stochastic fluctuations
(Durrett, 1991) or time lags (Gopalsamy, 1992).
8 Population Dynamics of Infectious Diseases
Applications of mathematical modelling to epidemiology, immunology and virology
are of increasing biomedical relevance. They help to understand the course of infec-
tious diseases both within organisms and within populations, and suggest guidelines
for treatment and vaccination.
Within a population, the interactions of infected, susceptible and immune or-
ganisms lead to endemic or epidemic spread of the disease. In a commonly used
epidemiological model (Anderson and May, 1992), if frequencies of uninfected and
infected hosts are denoted by x and y, this becomes
x˙ = k − dx+ cy − βxy (13)
y˙ = y(βx− d− v − c) (14)
where k is a constant birth (or immigration) term, d the mortality of uninfected, v
the extra mortality due to the infection, i.e. the virulence, and c the rate of recovery
(which in this simple model does not confer immunity). The model assumes that
new infections occur through random contacts between infected and susceptibles. An
infection can only spread if the frequency x of uninfected exceeds (d+c+v)/β. This
threshold principle, a cornerstone of epidemiology, holds for most of the variants of
the model (including immunity, other transmission mechanisms, periodic oscillations
in susceptiblity, other birth and death rates, etc). For many diseases, one has to
consider several classes of hosts (different risk groups, for instance, in the case of
AIDS). Some of these extensions lead to chaotic dynamics (Grenfell and Dobson,
1995, Olsen and Schaffer, 1990).
Infections are caused by pathogens (virus, bacteria, protozoa), which can all be
subsumed as parasites. In (13-14), the pathogen can invade only if the disease-free
equilibrium x = k/d is not saturated, i.e. if the basic reproductive rate
R0 =
kβ
d(d + v + c)
(15)
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(the number of secondary infections produced by an infected in a population of
susceptibles) exceeds 1.
The population dynamics of disease-carrying parasites, and their impact on the
population dynamics of the host, is an area of rapid growth. Even the simplest
models display oscillations (which for discrete time dynamics can be chaotic). The
relation between parasites and their host resembles that between predators and prey,
of course: parasites can mediate permanent co-existence between competing strains
of hosts, etc. Heteroclinic cycles are likely to occur, for instance when two strains
of a host engaged in a bistable competition are beset by two suitably specialised
strains of parasites: a resident population of host 1 can be invaded by parasite 1,
the resulting equilibrium can be invaded by host 2 (eliminating hosts and parasites
of type 1), which in turn allows parasite 2 to invade, etc.
The dynamics described so far deal with the course of an infection within a popu-
lation. Its development within an individual host is no less dramatic, and constitutes
a new chapter in biomathematics, dealing with the population dynamics and evo-
lution of the ‘biosphere’ beneath the skin of the host organism. These ecological
systems are ideally suited for modelling, since they involve huge populations and
short generations, and are subject of intensive clinical tests.
HIV offers the most studied example. As is well-known, the full-blown symptoms
of AIDS develop only after a latency period of some ten years. But this quietness
is misleading. Clinial tests based on simple dynamical models have revealed a fierce
battle between the virus and the immune system of the HIV-infected patient. The
average rate of HIV production exceeds 1010 particles a day. Free virus particles are
cleared within a few hours. Virus infected cells live on average two days.
HIV needs human cells (the ‘target cells’) to reproduce. In doing so, it kills
these cells. Hence virus and target cells interact in much the same way as predators
and their prey. But HIV is not only a predator, it is also a prey. The immune
system contains a vast repertoire of possible responses (different types of antibodies,
killer cells, etc), whose production is stimulated by specific pathogens. The immune
responses attack and destroy the pathogens. Thus killer cells and virus also interact
like predators and prey. Much clinical research has recently gone into finding out
which role – prey or predator – has more relevance for HIV dynamics? At present, it
appears that target cell limitation and immune control are of the same magnitude.
This leads to prey-predator-superpredator systems which, as known from ecology
(e.g. Hastings and Powell, 1991), exhibit complex dynamics. In our case, the
simplest model reduces to
x˙ = k − dx− βxv
y˙ = βxv − ay − pyz
v˙ = ry − sv (16)
z˙ = cyz − bz
Here x (resp. y) are the frequencies of uninfected (resp. infected) cells, v that of
free virus particles and z the abundance of the killer cells produced by the immune
response (Nowak and Bangham 1996, DeBoer and Perelson 1998). There is a min-
imum threshold of infected cells to activate an immune response (y > b/c). The
frequencies oscillate around an equilibrium value which can be stable or unstable,
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i.e. subject to a Hopf bifurcation. The model shows that increasing the respon-
siveness c of the immune system decreases the abundance y of infected cells, but
not necessarily the density z of the killer cells; in other words, there is no simple
correlation between virus load and the magnitude of the immune response.
9 The Evolution of Virulence
Most pathogens evolve very quickly, due to their short generation time, their high
mutation rate and the intensive selection pressure acting on them. HIV, for instance,
spends on average 1500 generations within the body of a patient. During this time,
its genetic diversity increases relentlessly, due to copying errors, so that the immune
system is faced with ever new challenges.
Mathematical models of the interaction between virus replication and immune
response led to completely new interpretations of disease progression in HIV infec-
tion (Nowak, 1991). HIV evolution can shift the steady state within an infected
individual, and lead to escape from immune responses. Such immune responses are
triggered by specific parts (so-called epitopes) of the virus. In the simplest model,
the virus has two epitopes with two variants each, yielding an eight-dimensional
predator-prey equation:
v˙ij = vij(rij − xi − yj)
x˙i = xi[ci(vi1 + vi2)− b] (17)
y˙j = yj[kj(v1j + v2j)− b]
where vij is the concentration of the virus with sequence i at the first and j at the
second epitope (1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2), and xi and yj are the concentrations of antibodies
directed at sequence i of the first resp. j of the second epitope. Generically, one
or two of the four viral species and the same number of antibody species have to
vanish, and the remaining densities oscillate (Nowak et al, 1995). A homogenous
virus population induces an ‘immunodominant’ response against a single epitope,
but a new variant at this epitope can cause the immune response to shift to the other
epitope. Heterogenous virus population stimulate complicated fluctuating responses.
This dynamic picture of HIV infection was confirmed by detailed analysis of virus
decay slopes in drug treated patients. Again mathematical models were at the core
of this newly developing demography of virus infection.
The extreme mutability of HIV explains also why drug-resistant forms emerge
so rapidly. Resistance against combinations of drugs requires several mutations.
Mathematical models help in devising optimum treatment schedules based on com-
bination therapy (Bonhoeffer et al, 1997).
This is one chapter of a ‘Darwinian medicine’ grounded in evolutionary biology.
In this domain, the evolution of virulence (i.e. the parasite-induced mortality of host
organisms) is of particular importance (Levin and Pimentel, 1980, Frank, 1995).
Pathogens use the bodies of their hosts both as resource and as vehicle. Textbook
knowledge presumed that parasites would always evolve towards decreased virulence,
since it is better to milk the host rather than butcher it. If parasites become too
virulent, they face extinction by depleting their reservoir of susceptibles. It was
concluded that successful parasites all become benign. The most impressive example
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of such an evolution towards harmlessness is the myxoma virus, released in Australia
to kill rabbits: within few years, the death rate of infected rabbits dropped from
more than 99 percent to less than 25 percent. Similar trends have been observed
in many human diseases. Adaptive dynamics shows that evolution can actually
turn parasites into mutualists necessary for the survival of their hosts (Law and
Dieckmann, 1998).
But not all parasites become harmless. Selection for a higher basic reproductive
rate R0 often leads to conflicting demands on infectivity and long-term exploitation.
If in (15), for instance, the virulence v is an increasing function of the transmission
rate β, then R0 need not necessarily decrease in v. And in the case of super-infection,
i.e. when several strains compete within a host, selection on parasites does not opti-
mise R0. Roughly speaking, more virulent strains will have a selective advantage in
the intra-host competition, and less virulent in the inter-host competition. Parasites
face a so-called tragedy of the commons: the need to outgrow their rivals forces them
to over-exploit the host, thus possibly driving their common resource to extinction.
Game theoretical arguments help in analysing such situations. In general, there will
be no evolutionarily stable strain (Nowak and May, 1996).
Of particular interest is the adaptive dynamics of viral particles which can spread
either by horizontal transmission, i.e. by infecting of new hosts, or by vertical
transmission, in the form of provirus integrated into the host’s genome. Even if we
assume that two strains cannot co-exist within one host (no superinfection), they
can coexist within the population if one is favoured by vertical and the other by
horizontal transmission (Lipsitch et al, 1996).
10 From the Red Queen to the Major Transitions
The parasite’s ecology is further complicated by countermeasures of the hosts which
tend to reduce virulence. Due to their short generation time, parasites can quickly
adapt to prevailing host defenses, but sexual reproduction allows host organisms to
recombine their genes and thus to present shifting targets to the pathogens trying
to enter the cells. Many evolutionary biologists view this as the main reason for
the prevalence of sexual reproduction (Hamilton, 1988). Indeed, the host faces a
peculiar problem of frequency dependent selection. Gene combinations for successful
immune systems tend to spread, but if they become too widespread, they cannot
remain successful, since parasites will adapt. Sexual host species keep reshuﬄing
their gene combinations, thus providing them with the advantage of being rare.
This is the so-called Red Queen theory of sex, named after a figure from the
sequel of Alice in Wonderland in whose realm ‘you have to run with all your speed’
just to stay in place – a familiar feature in co-evolution. A species can never stop
adapting since the other species do not stop either. Mathematical models for the
resulting arms races display a profusion of limit cycles, irregular oscillations and
heteroclinic attractors.
The Red Queen metapher makes evolution look like a treadmill rather than a
ladder to progress. Nevertheless, evolution has come up with increasingly complex
structures, through a sequence of major transitions (Maynard Smith and Szath-
mary, 1996). Cell differentiation, immune systems, or neural networks are examples
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of breakthrough inventions. So are the genetic code (translating polynucleotide
instructions into polypeptide machinery), the diploid genome (working with two ho-
mologous sets of genes), or sexual reproduction (producing offspring by recombining
genes from two parents).
Understanding these major transitions necessarily requires thought experiments
and mathematical modelling. A major issue for evolutionary biology is sex – a
cooperative activity causing an endless series of conflicts. In the wake of the primary
question – why should an organism transmit only half of its genes to its offspring? –
many other problems surface: Why do sexually reproducing species have two sexes,
rather than three, or one? Why are their roles asymmetrical (males producing tiny
sperm cells and females large egg cells)? Why is the sex ratio close to one? Why
are males fighting for females, and why are females choosier than males? And, since
this is biology: why are there exceptions to all these rules? All these questions have
been adressed by evolutionary game theory (see e.g. Hutson and Law, 1993, Karlin
and Lessard, 1986, or Ywasa and Sasaki, 1987).
Some of the major transitions in evolution led to new levels of organisation,
for instance self-replicating molecules, chromosomes, cells, multi-cellular organisms,
colonies and societies. In most cases, this emergence of nested hierarchies was due
to the fusion of formerly independent units into entities of higher order. These
remain threatened by exploitation through mutinies of ’selfish’ elements improving
their own propagation at a heavy cost to the entire organism. Cancer cells grow
without restraint; within a genome, so-called ‘outlaw genes’ subvert the segregation
of chromosomes in a cell division; etc. Each such instance of cooperation is riddled
with internal conflicts.
Selfishness may have been an issue since the dawn of life, when several types of
self-replicating RNA molecules must have ‘ganged up’ in order to code for chemical
functions. How could they co-exist? As one possible solution, Eigen and Schuster
(1975) suggested the ‘hypercycle’, a closed feedback loop of chemical kinetics, with
RNA of typeMi catalysing the replication of RNA of typeMi+1 (counting the indices
i mod n). The equation for the relative densities xi of Mi is given by the replicator
equation (7), with fi = xi−1Fi(x) and Fi > 0 for all i. (If the Fi are constants, there
exists a globally stable fixed point in intSn for n < 5, and a stable periodic orbit
for n ≥ 5, see Hofbauer et al, 1991.) This dynamics is always permanent, so that
hypercyclic coupling does indeed guarantee the coexistence of all RNA types. But
if there occurs an RNA type M which profits from Mi more than Mi+1 does, then
M will displace Mi+1, even if it confers no catalytic benefits to the other RNA; such
a molecular parasite destroys the whole cycle.
11 The Evolution of Cooperation
Evolutionary history began with molecular networks and led to tightly-knit societies
acting as coherently as single organisms do. Bee hives and termite states furnish
striking examples. Their extraordinary degree of cooperation is due to the close
kinship between all members of a society: a gene for helping one’s sister is helping
copies of itself. The close relatedness within a bee hive is due to the fact that only
very few of its members reproduce. This type of cooperation can be explained by
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kinship theory. It is based on the rule that an altruistic act costing c to the donor
(in terms of reproductive success) and benefitting b to the recipient has a selective
advantage if the relatedness between donor and recipient exceeds the cost-to-benefit
ratio c/b.
In human societies, kinship accounts only for a small part of the cooperation: the
larger part is due to economic rather than genetic factors. The simplest mechanism
is direct reciprocation: as long as c < b it pays to help others if they will return
the help. This creates new opportunities for parasitism, by not returning help.
Game theory provides a ready-made model succintely capturing this aspect. The
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a symmetric game between two players who can opt
between the moves C (to cooperate) and D (to defect). The payoff matrix is
C D
C
D
(
R S
T P
)
(18)
with
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S (19)
(the first condition means that the reward R for mutual cooperation is larger than
the punishment P for mutual defection, but that the temptation T for unilateral
defection is still larger, and the sucker’s payoff S for being exploited ranks lowest.
In our case, R = b− c, P = 0, T = b and S = −c). Obviously, it is best to play D,
no matter what the other is doing.
This changes if we assume that there is always a probability w for a further round,
which is larger than (T −R)/(T − P ) = c/b. The iterated PD game has a random
number of rounds with mean (1 − w)−1 and admits a huge set of strategies. This
model led to a vast amount of investigations, often based on computer tournaments
simulating populations of players meeting randomly and engaging in an iterated PD
game. In Axelrod’s first tournaments, (see Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) the Tit
For Tat strategy TFT (play C in the first round and from then on repeat the co-
player’s previous move) performed extremely well, despite its simplicity. But TFT
is not evolutionarily stable (Selten and Hammerstein, 1984): indeed, the strategy of
always cooperating can spread by neutral drift in a population of TFT players, and
defectors can subsequently invade. Moreover, errors between TFT players lead to
costly runs of alternating defections.
To analyse the iterated PD under noise (i.e. with a small probability of genetic
or strategic errors), let us first consider memory-one strategies only. Such strategies
are given by the probability to play C in the first round, and a quadruple p =
(pR, pS, pT , pP ), where pi denotes the player’s propensity for move C after having
experienced outcome i ∈ {R, S, T, P} in the previous round. Due to ocasional
mistakes, the initial move plays almost no role in long interactions (w close to 1).
The dynamics becomes extremely complex: for instance, restriction to the following
four strategies leads to a heteroclinic network as attractor (see Fig. 3b): (1) Tit
For Tat (1, 0, 1, 0), (2) the more tolerant Firm But Fair (1, 0, 1, 1) which forgives an
opponent’s defection if it was matched by an own defection, (3) the parasitic Bully
(0, 0, 0, 1) which cooperates only after punishment and (4) the strategy (0, 0, 0, 0)
which always defects.
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But if we introduce occasional mutants, then long-term evolution leads (for 2R >
T +P , i.e. b > 2c) to the so-called Pavlov strategy (1, 0, 0, 1) which coperates only if
the co-player, in the previous round, acted like oneself (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993).
This strategy embodies the simplest learning rule, called ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ by
experimental psychologists. It consists in repeating the previous move if the payoff
was high (R or T ) and in switching to the other option if it was low (P or S).
Pavlov players cooperate with each other; an erroneous defection leads in the next
round to both players defecting, and then to a resumption of mutual cooperation.
Furthermore, Pavlov populations cannot be invaded by other strategies, and in
particular not by indiscriminate cooperators who, as mentioned before, pave the
way for defectors. On the other hand, Pavlov cannot invade a strategy of defectors:
this needs a small cluster of strongly retaliatory strategies like TFT, who eliminate
unconditional defectors and then yield to Pavlov.
What about strategies with longer memory, or yet more general finite-state au-
tomata? Such strategies are defined by a finite set Ω of inner states, some (possibly
stochastic) rule specifying which move to play when in state ω, and a rule specifying
the transition to the next state as a function of the current state and of the outcome
of the previous round (R, S, T or P ). Together with the initial state, this defines a
strategy for the iterated PD (Leimar, 1997). An example is given by the following
table.
R S T P
1 1 2 3 1
2 1 2 1 2
3 1 1 3 3
It is easy to check that this example satisfies a variant of evolutionary stability:
against a co-player using that strategy, it is best, at every stage of the game, to
follow the same strategy. This defines a social norm. There are many such norms
(including Pavlov, if 2R > T + P ), and it is not easy to decide which will get
selected. But this example seems particularly successful, and it has an intuitive
appeal, if we interpret state 2 as ‘provoked’ and state 3 as ‘contrite’: indeed, an
erroneous defection by one player makes that player feel contrite, and the co-player
provoked: the retaliation redresses the balance. Such inner states correspond to
emotions, which are increasingly seen as tools for handling the complexities of social
life.
12 Indirect Reciprocity
Obviously, the iterated PD captures only a part of the cooperative interactions in
human societies. There is another, indirect reciprocity, whereby an altruistic act
is returned, not by the recipient (as with direct reciprocity), but by someone else.
Indirect reciprocity involves reputation. A simple model assumes that a score is
attached to each player, which increases (or decreases) whenever the player provides
(or witholds) help. Players help whenever the score of the potential recipient exceeds
some threshold. This threshold is subject to selection. Punishing a low-scorer is
costly, as it decreases one’s own score; but if defectors are not punished, they take
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Figure 4: Dynamics of indirect reciprocity
over. Assuming that each player is engaged in a few rounds, both as potential donor
and recipient (but never meeting the same co-player twice), one finds that mutation-
selection chronicles lead toward cooperation, provided players know their co-players’
score sufficiently well (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998).
Occasionally, waves of defection sweep through the population: they are provoked
by an excessive frequency of indiscriminate altruists (who are too ready to help low-
scorers). Cooperation is more robust if the society is challenged more frequently by
invasion attempts of defectors (an intriguing parallel to immune systems). This can
be nicely captured by an even simpler model involving only three types of players,
with frequencies x1, x2, x3, namely (a) indiscriminate altruists, (b) defectors, and (c)
discriminate altruists who help except if the co-player witheld help. If we assume
two rounds per player, for instance, both as a donor and as a recipient, the payoffs
are
f1 = 2(b− c− bx2)
f2 = 2bx1 + bx3 (20)
f3 = 2(b− c)− cx2.
If discriminating altruists are too rare, i.e. if x3 < c/(b−c), defectors take over. But
all orbits with x3 > c/(b− c) lead from the edge x2 = 0 (no defectors) back to itself.
A mixture of altruists gets established. We may expect that random drift makes
the state fluctuate along this edge, which consists of fixed points only, and that
occasionally, mutation introduces a small quantity x2 of defectors. What happens?
If x3 > 2c/b, defectors cannot invade. If
2c
b
> x3 >
c
b− c
, (21)
the invading defectors thrive at first, but are subsequently eliminated by discrim-
inating altruists. After such an abortive invasion, the ratio of discriminators to
indiscriminate altruists is so large that defectors can no longer invade. Only when
random fluctuations cross the interval given by (21), will defectors take over. But
this takes time. If defectors try too often to invade, they will not succeed (see
Fig. 4). Imperfect as they are, such models show how cooperation emerges through
– 17 –
the selection of learning rules, moralistic emotions, social norms and reputation.
Thus evolutionary models explain the ceaseless give and take prevailing in human
societies, and lead game theory back towards its original economic motivation.
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